Sabah & Sarawak: The Forgotten Equal Partners of the Federation of Malaya
In conjunction with Malaysia Day, this article seeks to address the various grievances Sabah and Sarawak have had towards the government of Malaysia as a result of the non-fulfilment of MA63.
SUARA MANDIRI Issue #8
“Merdeka! Merdeka! Merdeka!” The chants by the late Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman echoed seven times throughout the stadium, with the crowd following suit, armed with hopes for a new beginning on the morning of 31 August 1957. Six years after the declaration of independence for the Federation of Malaya from Britain’s colonial rule, the Federation of Malaysia was formed on 16 September 1963, now known as Malaysia Day in commemoration of the inclusion of the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak.
However, few Malaysians are truly cognisant of the events leading up to the union, or in particular, the promises made (and broken) for the union to take place.
The proposal for the formation of a new federation encompassing the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo (Sabah) and Brunei was put forth by Tunku Abdul Rahman on 27 May 1961, during a meeting with foreign correspondents in Singapore.[1]
The idea was mainly borne of Tunku’s concerns about ethnic composition - he was not in favour of a federation comprising only of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya (the initial idea) due to the racial imbalance[2] possibly giving rise to social and political conflicts.[3] With the inclusion of Sarawak, North Borneo (Sabah) and Brunei as assured by the British, the number of Malays and natives of the three territories would slightly outnumber the predominantly Singaporean Chinese.[4] Other reasons mooted by Tunku included the enhancement of security in the face of communism and “a closer economic and political association”.[5]
On 17 January 1962, the Cobbold Commission was set up with the task to garner opinions from the people of North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak on the idea of “Malaysia” and their agreement to the union, provided their rights were guaranteed. The Commission then proposed to set up the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) to secure the autonomy and special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak through constitutional arrangements. Following the establishment of the IGC, Sabah and Sarawak put forward 20-point and 18-point Agreements respectively, to safeguard their rights.
On 9 July 1963, the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (“MA63”) was signed in London and registered under the United Nations secretariat, making it an international treaty and cannot be amended in the Malaysian Parliament. The MA63 consists of 11 Articles forming the basis of the Malaysia Act (Act 26/1963), and amending the Constitution to reflect the union between Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore, as well as the formation of “Malaysia”.[6] Thereafter, Sabah and Sarawak were deemed equal partners to Semenanjung Malaysia and were given autonomy, assured under MA63.
Prior to 1976, Article 1(2) of the Federal Constitution read together with Article 1(3) established the “Borneo states” and Singapore as separate territories or equal to the Federation of Malaya (the nine Malay states, Penang and Malacca).[7] However, the rights of the Sabahans and Sarawakians have since been diluted by the constitutional amendment of 1976, effectively corroding the special position of Sabah and Sarawak, as they were relegated instead to become mere states of Malaysia.[8] This meant Sabah and Sarawak would be treated as equals to other states under the Federation of Malaysia instead of equal to the federation as a whole.[9]
The 1976 amendment became a written proof of the high degree of autonomy initially promised to Sabah and Sarawak diminishing. The economic development previously guaranteed to Sabah and Sarawak was seen to not be fulfilled, and their infrastructure remained immensely underdeveloped compared to West Malaysia.[10]
In light of Malaysia Day, this article seeks to address the various grievances Sabahans and Sarawakians have had towards the government of Malaysia as a result of the non-fulfilment of the MA63, which precipitated the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in the first place.
The marginalisation of indigenous people
The indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak constitute around 50% of the combined population of these two states.[11] These indigenous peoples are not a homogenous whole but are composed of different groups such as Kadazandusun, Iban, Bajau, Bidayuh and many more. They have inhabited the land for generations, professed their own religions, practised unique customs and ways of life.
Unfortunately, despite being indigenous, a large number of natives are stateless. Nomadic groups, semi-nomadic groups, and groups traditionally occupying coastal areas are disproportionately affected, with the Bajau Laut people getting the short end of the stick.[12] Stateless persons lack access to education, healthcare, and governmental aid, just to name a few.
The inequality faced by the indigenous people was further exacerbated by “Project IC”.[13] Project IC refers to a government initiative of issuing identity cards to undocumented immigrants between 1979 to 1996,[14] a move some have perceived unfair to the indigenous people who have lived in the country for generations and were still yet to be granted citizenship, continuing to suffer from the perils of statelessness.
Apart from their citizenship, natives also face challenges in staking their claim on ancestral lands. On paper, laws such as the Sabah Land Ordinance and the Land Code (1958) protects their customary land rights. Alas, the reality is, rights granted under these restrictive laws do not actually amount to possession of the land.[15] Far from entrenching native title rights in the law, the government has freely granted logging concessions, permits for large plantations, and built dams on the natives’ ancestral lands.[16]
Mass deforestation has not only negatively impacted the environment but destroyed the livelihood of the natives (not to mention the fact they are usually compensated poorly if they were to receive any at all).[17] To add insult to injury, repressive laws such as the Forest Ordinance 2015 and the Land Surveyors Bill 2001 were passed to prevent natives from protesting against deforestation on their ancestral lands.[18] On the other hand, some ancestral lands have become protected as forest reserves, hence restricting the natives’ access to gather forest resources or reside.[19] It is no surprise then, despite the economic growth in East Malaysia, indigenous peoples continue to suffer disproportionately from poverty.[20]
Lack of access to education is another major issue faced by the indigenous peoples of East Malaysia.[21] Only 30% of indigenous pupils (including those from Peninsular Malaysia) managed to complete their secondary education, as compared to the national figure of 71.7%.[22] Contributing factors to the high dropout rate includes poverty and lack of transport.
Some rural settlements lack accessible roads, and the children can only go to school by foot, boat rides, or tagging along with the logging workers for a ride.[23] Women and girls become particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse when they rely on loggers for transport.[24] Furthermore, even if the children manage to overcome numerous hardships to go to school, the Malaysian education system does not do them justice.
The mainstream curriculum emphasises classroom settings and subject matters foreign to the natives’ environment and culture.[25] Most teachers lack training in indigenous pedagogy, and many teachers refuse their postings to indigenous schools for fear of being deemed somehow “inferior” by their peers teaching elsewhere.[26] Using languages like Malay or English as the main teaching medium raises the difficulty even further.
Not too long ago, certain indigenous groups used to have teaching materials written in their own languages. Unfortunately, most of the books were destroyed when the Borneo Literature Bureau was replaced by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka in 1977.[27] This forceful cultural assimilation has done great damage to the preservation of indigenous culture – different cultures are to be respected, not homogenised. Our education system needs to be revised to make room for cultural diversity.
Federal Intervention in State Politics
Decades after the formation of Malaysia, the Federal Government has often interfered with the local politics in Sabah and Sarawak, orchestrating to their advantage.
The earliest instance of such interference in Sarawak was in 1966. The Sarawak Alliance government under the leadership of Sarawak's first Chief Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, fell as a direct consequence of the Federal Government’s intervention. One year prior to the fall of the Ningkan administration, Ningkan had taken no notice of the objections made by the political opposition over a piece of legislation on land tenure to make land available to non-native Sarawakians.
Ultimately, Ningkan’s political opponents sought the Federal Government’s assistance to topple the Ningkan administration, and they were all too willing as they thought that Ningkan was too anti-federal. Ningkan had previously irked the Federal Government for adhering rigidly to the 18-point Memorandum, a list of terms Sarawak had proposed prior to the formation of Malaysia. In June 1966, 21 members of the Sarawak State Assembly petitioned the Governor, declaring their loss of confidence in Ningkan's leadership. This instigated then Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to demand Ningkan's resignation.
Without a formal motion of no-confidence and under the pressure of federal leaders, the Governor declared Ningkan was no longer the Chief Minister and replaced him with Tawi Sli, a pro-federal politician as the new Chief Minister. Ningkan sought legal redress through the Kuching High Court, and his removal was held to be unconstitutional as only the Council Negri had the power to do so, and thus Ningkan was reinstated as the Chief Minister. Unsatisfied with the decision of the court, in September 1966, the Federal Government declared a state of emergency in Sarawak on the ground, “a serious situation which poses a grave threat not only to the security of the State of Sarawak but also to the whole country” had arisen.
Subsequently, an amendment was made to Article 150 of the Sarawak Constitution, giving the Governor powers to call for a special sitting of the Council Negri without the approval of the Chief Minister. While Sarawak was in a state of emergency, a Council Negri was quickly called, during which a formal vote of no confidence was taken against Ningkan and he was officially ousted.[28]
Meanwhile, in Sabah, during the early decade of the state’s independence, two prominent Sabahan politicians dominated the domestic politics: Mustapha Harun, a representative of the Muslim natives, and Donald Stephens, a representative of the non-Muslim natives. In 1963, when the Sabah Alliance formed the first post-independent government, Stephens was appointed as the Chief Minister and Mustapha as the Governor. In 1965, Stephens displeased the Federal Government for rightfully asserting the state’s constitutional rights, especially over the emphasis of the Federal Government on the Islamic faith and intrusion in the appointment of state officials.
In retaliation, the Federal Government replaced Stephens with Mustapha as the Chief Minister and to keep an eye on him, Stephens was appointed as the Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs instead. The administration led by Mustapha lasted only until 1975 when the Federal Government received intelligence of Mustapha’s plans to secede Sabah from Malaysia.
Once again, it did not take long for the Federal Government to interfere - they openly assisted Harris Salleh, one of Mustapha's vice-presidents in the ruling United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), to establish a new party, Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (Berjaya), to challenge USNO in the 1976 State Election. In the end, Berjaya managed to defeat USNO with the help of the Federal Government and the Mustapha administration collapsed.[29] [30]
Development Disparity between the East and West
When we talk about development and progress in the Borneo states, the conversation will inevitably involve money. To even initiate and maintain basic infrastructure alone would require a huge fiscal endeavour from the authorities, never mind the dangling of promise to upgrades during election periods. Originally under MA63, Sabah and Sarawak are entitled to special annual grants from the Federal Government[31] and a significant percentage of revenue from the petroleum extracted from the oil-rich states.
However, the introduction of the Petroleum Development Act 1974 led to the transfer of essentially a state right to the exclusive control over all petroleum resources in Malaysia by the Federal Government via the national oil corporation, PETRONAS. This left Sabah and Sarawak with a meagre 5% of petroleum revenue, despite the East Malaysian states producing the largest share of the country’s petroleum output. Moreover, pursuant to MA63 and Article 112C and 112D of the Federal Constitution, the states are entitled to special grants subjected to reviews every five years. However, the Federal Government has consistently failed to conduct said reviews and has never offered commensurate inflation and cost-adjusted increments to address their needs. The last review was conducted 52 years ago in 1969 with Sarawak receiving a measly RM16 mil per annum and Sabah RM26.7 mil per annum. Only recently, the Federal Government offered to double the rate in Budget 2020.[32] As of 17 September 2021, the incumbent Prime Minister Ismail Sabri has stated the Federal Government’s commitment in honouring the MA63, including the special grants.[33]
It is without a doubt that the under-development in East Malaysia is caused by the irresponsible neglect of the financial obligation of the Federal Government. Therefore it is no surprise that when we compare the state of development in Sabah and Sarawak with their counterparts in West Malaysia, there is a glaring disparity causing a schism and unwillingly pits East Malaysians against West Malaysians. The most apparent one is the lack of highways connecting the two states and the condition of the available roads.[34] As of August 2021, the Pan-Borneo Highway (LPB) project is only 70% completed on the Sarawakian section, and the whole project is expected to be completed in 2023.[35] This RM27 billion project has been raved about for years, before finally coming into action decades later and is still yet to be completely realised to date.[36]
It takes 8 hours 15 minutes to travel a distance of 461 km from Kuching to Mukah, whereas in the same time span, one can travel from Johor Bahru to Perlis, a distance of 819 km. While to a certain extent this can be attributed to geographical factors restricting road construction, the condition of the roads between districts, neither well-lit nor maintained, with some parts of the roads missing asphalt, has no excuse. Moreover, there is also a lack of rest stops and gas stations along existing highways.[1] [2] [3]
Due to the poor condition of the roads, Sabahans and Sarawakians lack inter-city connectivity, which in turn hamstrings economic growth in the states. Transport infrastructure is even worse within the districts leading to a lack of economic mobility for Sabahans and Sarawakians. For example, the rural town of Kapit in Sarawak shares a border with Kalimantan with several Iban longhouses and villages scattered all over the district. To reach the town centre, the villagers are required to travel via river or pickup trucks to traverse the jungle. The district lacks paved roads between the town and the villages. It is 2021, yet locals must still traverse long distances via the river. This is not an isolated situation: various villages in Sabah and Sarawak face this issue, and some have it worse whereby the only way to travel is via rural airways which costs more to maintain than a properly paved road.
This situation has impeded the economic development of these villages, as they are unable to pivot away from labour-intensive sectors such as agriculture, a permanent feature in these villages. Further, these conditions also hinder access to education, healthcare, and electoral participation.
There is also an obvious disparity in the quality of education and healthcare. According to data from the Department of Statistics Malaysia, teachers in the Borneo states teach more students compared to teachers in West Malaysia.[37] Similar situations can be seen in medical care where the doctor-population ratio is higher in East Malaysia.[38] In Sabah, there is 1 doctor for every 958 people compared to 1 doctor for every 369 in Kuala Lumpur.[39]
Given Sabah and Sarawak’s massive economic and financial contribution to the development of Malaysia, it is more than fair for these states to be allowed to share an equal level of development as West Malaysia’s counterparts.
Restoring the status of Sabah and Sarawak as Equal Partners of the Federation of Malaya
In taking the first plunge towards the restoration of the status of Sabah and Sarawak as equal partners of the Federation of Malaya, the Parliament and members of the Cabinet must take proactive measures to honour the MA63. Although the sanctity and quasi-constitutional status of the agreement have been repeatedly affirmed by our courts, in cases such as Nor Anak Nyawai & Ors v Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 6 MLJ 241, Sreenevasan v Ketua Pengarah Imigresen, Malaysia & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 92 and Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government of Malaysia [1968] 2 MLJ 238, there were minimal legal decisions impacting towards the restoration of the agreement and many areas in Sabah and Sarawak have suffered debilitating setbacks not only from their ability to be financially secure, but also with regards to their social and infrastructural development, as well as the preservation of their ethnic, cultural, and religious uniqueness as a result of the Federal Government’s lack of concerted effort in honouring MA63.
The promises made under MA63 must be honoured to restore Sabah and Sarawak’s inherent control and autonomy over their territories and impose a delimitation of constituencies. Given the historical and demographic differences between Sabah and Sarawak and the rest of the Federation of Malaya, it is no wonder imposing the Malayan political model on these Borneo states has been fraught with failures.[40] If such promises continue to be broken, there will certainly be a high price to pay, while the strained federal-state relations will only continue to deteriorate.
Conjunctively, in recognizing Sabah and Sarawak as equal partners of the Federation as enshrined in MA63, the amendment of Article 1(2) of the Federal Constitution in reversion to its original position prior to 1976 is imperative. There have been efforts in amending Article 1(2) as evident in 2019, but alas, the Constitutional Amendment Bill was short of 10 votes and thus failed to get the mandatory two-thirds majority support in the Dewan Rakyat[41]. It is important to restore the wording of Article 1(2) even if it is only symbolic in nature. The amendment should be followed through by further legislative and policy decisions to reinstate the constitutional standing of Sabah and Sarawak, having been undermined by various constitutional, legal, administrative, and fiscal measures.
Nevertheless, there has been some effort to honour MA63 by the Federal Government in 2020. Previously, under Pillar 4 of the Pakatan Harapan administration’s manifesto, the government of the day promised a better deal for Sabah and Sarawak, with a special council to evaluate and oversee the fair implementation of MA63 during the first 100 days in office.[42] However, out of the 21 matters identified to be pertaining to the implementation of MA63, only 17 were approved and later presented in the council's official meeting in 2020, chaired by new Prime Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin under the new Perikatan Nasional administration.[43] The council had accepted the terms of reference for discussions on restoring state rights of Sabah and Sarawak under the federation.
Approved by the council, the formation of three working committees under the council to deal with matters pertaining: (1) the Federal Constitution and equal status, (2) security and immigrant issues, and (3) socio-economic matters (including the implementation of 12th Malaysia Plan).[44] However, at the time of writing, only 3 out of the 17 issues discussed, have been considered to be solved.[45]
Further, the MA63 special committee report was not made public on the basis of the outcome yet to be fully settled. Following a meeting with the Attorney General earlier this month, Datuk Seri Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office (Parliament and Law), disclosed that the Attorney General's Chambers has agreed to assist the government in looking into the legal aspects of the government sector's transformation and Parliament, as well as MA63.[46]
As the implementation of MA63 is one of the key areas outlined in the bipartisan Memorandum of Understanding signed on 13 September 2021, it is pivotal for the MA63 Special Council to be transparent on the reports and conclusion of each meeting to overcome the distrust due to the Federal Government’s long history of omission in giving opportunities to the Borneo state leaders in making decisions for their respective states.[47]
Do better for our fellow Malaysians
At the end of the day, changes are dependent on the initiative and the political will of those in power, to make amends in closing the gap of disparity between the Federation of Malaya and Sabah and Sarawak and to enforce MA63 as intended by our forefathers. Restoring the position of Sabah and Sarawak will not only provide further autonomy to the respective states but also the long-awaited enforcement of the promises previously delayed by the Federal Government.
After all said and done, the only way we are able to strive together towards collective economic and social development is by acknowledging Sabah and Sarawak as equal partners of the Federation, and heed their pleas for the promised better standards of living. Sabah and Sarawak must not be treated as mere afterthoughts any longer, they deserve much better for they, too, are Malaysians.
References:
[1] Lee Meiyu, ‘Federation of Malaysia’ Singapore Infopedia <https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2019-07-15_170844.html> accessed 16 September 2021.
[2] Cheah Boon Kheng, ‘The reasons for Malaysia’s formation’ The Sun (24 July 2007) <https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/news/legal-and-general-news/general-news/the-reasons-for-malaysia-s-formation> accessed 16 September 2021.
[3] Muhammad Hadi Abdullah, ‘Brunei’s Political Development And The Formation of Malaysia: 1961-1967’ DPhil thesis - The University of Hull (2002) <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6205772.pdf> accessed 15 September 2021.
[4] Supra 2
[5] Inamur Rehman, ‘The Making of Malaysia’, Pakistan Horizon (1963) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/i40066503> accessed 16 September 2021.
[6] Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia in 1963.
[7] “Putrajaya to amend constitution to restore Sabah, Sarawak status” Malaysiakini (8 March 2019) <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/467186> accessed 15 September 2021.
[8] Supra 1
[9] Wong Chin Huat, ‘Sabah and Sarawak downgraded by their MPs in 1976’ Malaysiakini (8 April 2019) <‘https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/471345> accessed 16 September 2021.
[10] ‘Is Malaysia heading for ‘BorneoExit? Why some in East Malaysia are advocating for secession’ The Conversation (25 September 2020) <https://theconversation.com/is-malaysia-heading-for-borneoexit-why-some-in-east-malaysia-are-advocating-for-secession-146208> accessed 16 September 2021.
[11] Aiken, S. Robert, & Leigh, Colin H., ‘In the Way of Development: Indigenous Land-rights Issues in Malaysia’. (2011) 10 101(4), Geographical Review, 471.
[12] ‘Ending Statelessness in Malaysia’. (UNHCR) <https://www.unhcr.org/ending-statelessness-in-malaysia.html> accessed 9 September 2021.
[13] Yaman, Steve. ‘From illegal immigrant to 'new bumiputera’’ Malaysiakini (31 January 2013) <https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/220293> Accessed 9 September 2021.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Aiken, S. Robert, & Leigh, Colin H “In the Way of Development: Indigenous Land-rights Issues in Malaysia”. (2011) 10 101(4), Geographical Review, 471.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Cultural Survival. “Observations of the State of Indigenous Human Rights in Malaysia.” 2018. 31st Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review.
[22] Nor, Sharifah Md, Samsilah Roslan, Aminuddin Mohamed, Kamaruddin Hj. Abu Hassan, Mohamad Azhar Mat Ali, and Jaimah Abdul Manaf. ‘Dropout Prevention Initiatives for Malaysian Indigenous Orang Asli Children’ (2011) 8(1) International Journal on School Disaffection, 42.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ya Shin Wan, ‘Education Policies in Overcoming Barriers Faced by Orang Asli Children: Education for all’ Kuala Lumpur: IDEAS Policy Research Berhad (2020).
[26] Ibid.
[27] ‘Burial & Burning of Iban & Borneon Language Books by Malaysian Government’ Star Today (2013) <http://startodaynews.blogspot.com/2013/11/burial-burning-of-iban-borneon-language.html> accessed 9 September 2021.
[28] Chin J, ‘Politics of Federal Intervention in Malaysia, with Reference to Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan’ (1997) 35 The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 96.
[29] Kahin AR, ‘Crisis on the Periphery: The Rift Between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah’ (1992) 65 Pacific Affairs 30.
[30] Chin J, ‘Politics of Federal Intervention in Malaysia, with Reference to Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan’ (1997) 35 The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 96.
[31] Part IV and V of the Tenth Schedule of the Malaysia Agreement 1963.
[32] Ministry of Finance Malaysia, Budget 2020 (2019).
[33] ‘MA63: PM Ismail Sabri shows determination in meeting Sabah, Sarawak's demands, says PBS’ The Edge Markets (Kuala Lumpur, 17 September 2021) <https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/ma63-pm-ismail-sabri-shows-determination-meeting-sabah-sarawaks-demands-says-pbs> accessed 20 September 2021.
[34] Ladin, Mohd Azizul Bin, Fariq Ismeth Jaimin, Nazaruddin Abdul Taha, Lillian Gungat, Abdul Karim Mirasa, Sidah Binti Idrish, ‘Study on the Transportation System in the East Coast of Sabah’ 2020 9(4) IJRTE <https://www.ijrte.org/wp-content/uploads/papers/v9i4/B3891079220.pdf> accessed 20 September 2021.
[35] Opalyn Mok, ‘Putrajaya committed to complete the Pan Borneo Highway, says works minister’ The Malay Mail (Seberang Perai, 28 September 2021) <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/09/28/putrajaya-committed-to-complete-the-pan-borneo-highway-says-works-minister/2009006> accessed 29 September 2021.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Department of Statistics Malaysia, Stats Geo Portal <https://statsgeo.mycensus.gov.my/geostats/mapv2.php#> accessed 13 September 2020.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] James Chin, ‘The 1963 Malaysia Agreement (MA63): Sabah and Sarawak and the Politics of Historical Grievances’ in S. Lemiere (ed), Minorities Matter: Malaysian Politics and People (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019) <https://www.academia.edu/41542761/The_1963_Malaysia_Agreement_MA63_Sabah_And_Sarawak_and_the_Politics_of_Historical_Grievances> accessed 14 September 2021
[41] ‘Bill to make Sabah, Sarawak equal partners rejected in Malaysia parliament’ Channel News Asia (10 April 2019) accessed 14 September 2021.
[42] Welsh, B., Vilashini Somiah, Benjamin YH Loh, ‘Sabah from the Ground: The 2020 Elections and the Politics of Survival’ (SRID, 2021) 39-46.
[43] Muguntan Vanar, ‘PM chairs inaugural MA63 special committee meeting’ The Star (2 December 2020) <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/12/02/pm-chairs-inaugural-ma63-special-committee-meeting> accessed on 14 September 2021.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] ‘Wan Junaidi: AGC to assist ministry on govt, Parliament transformation and MA63’ The Borneo Post (15 September 2021) <https://www.theborneopost.com/2021/09/15/wan-junaidi-agc-to-assist-ministry-on-govt-parliament-transformation-and-ma63/> accessed 17 September 2021.
[47] Sulok Tawie, ‘Work towards implementing MA63 as it’s a key focus of bipartisan MoU, Sarawak DAP says’ Malaysiakini (14 September 2021) <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/09/14/work-towards-implementing-ma63-as-its-a-key-focus-of-bipartisan-mou-sarawak/2005545> accessed on 15 September 2021.